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from permitting the use of municipal recreational facilities 
by any school, group, club, or organization which was racially 
segregated or had a racially discriminatory admissions policy. 
I 
The District Court (Frank M. Johnson) found that the City makes ---its recreational facilities available to private groups, includ-
ing schools, churches, civic clubs, and charitable organizations. 
Among the private schools taking advantage of the opportunity to 
use municipal recreational facilities are two schools with no 
blacks in attendance that have declared open-enrollment policies, 
and one school with a published discriminatory admissions policy. 
The District Court concluded that "[a]s to these and all other 
segregated private schools, the city's aid is unconstitutional." 
-
( Petn. 19a) The District Court analogized the present case to 
those cas ~, which struck down tuition grant statutes. In the 
present cas e. , like the tuition grant cas es, (1) ''Montgomery is 
providing aid to private, segregated schools, thus encouraging and 
facilitat i _. ; their establishment and operation as an alternative 
for white students who in most instances are seeking to avoid 
desegregated public schools" and (2) ''Montgomery's school board 
and all other city governmental officials are under an affirmative 
constitutional duty to desegregate." (Petn. 20a) The District 
Court rejected the notion that the extent of the aid, rather than 
~
the effect of the aid, is determinative, but went on to hold that 
"the aid provided in the present case is substantial and it .,._ ________________ ~ ---







• • • The opportunity to participate 
in sports contributes considerably to 
the attractiveness of any school and 
thereby enhances enrollments while, in 
the instances now presented, drawing 
students away from the public school 
system. In addition, the city saves 
private schools money by furnishing 
them a place to play free of charge. 
The cost of buying land and maintain-
ing a football field, or of building 
a gymnasium, requires a substantial 
financial outlay. The money saved, of 
course, is being used to operate these 
private, segregated institutions. Even 
more significant, the city's aid in 
this case provides a means by which the 
school can raise extra revenue through 
the sale of tickets and refreshments • 
Needless to say, the creation and opera-
tion of these private, segregated schools 
is to the detriment of a racially balanced 
public school system in Montgomery, Alabama. 
The District Court rej ected the City's argument that it need only 
make the facilities available to ali groups on a nondiscriminatory 
basis in order to satisfy its constitutional duty and rejected 
the argument that the "declared" open admissions policies of two 
of the schools , i n l ight of the segregated student bodies, con-
stituted a defense . With respect to private clubs, however, the 
District Court noted that the city officials are not under an af-
firmative duty to end discrimination in these clubs. "Consequently 
although state aid to such a group is unconstitutional,._ if the 
[ +ov-\11-t a,Ll~ a.;i-pl i'c.,~ ~ J r 
organizationAdiscri minate~ on the basis of race, the mere fact that 
such an organization is segregated is not enough to render state 
aid t o i t per se constitutionally improper." (Petn. 25a) The 
Distric t Court, accordingly, enjoined the respondents from per-






schools, or private school affiliated groups, if the school 
or gr oup "is racially segregated or if it has a racially dis-
criminatory admissions policy," _an~the District Court enjoined 
the respondents from permitting the use of such facilities "by 
any private group, club or organization which has a racially 
discriminatory admissions policy." (Petn. 25a-26a) 
3. OP INION BELOW: The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. The Court held that the District Court 
was correct in "forbid[ding] scheduling athletic contests and 
. 
similar functions which involve segregated private schools in 
municipa l facilities." (Petn. 9a-10a) However, the Court of 
Appeals went on to draw a distinction between "exclusive" and -
"nonexclusive" users of municipal facilities. It concluded that 
the Dis t 1;5.ct Court was "well with~n the ambit of its equitable 
discretion" in finding that granting "exclusive" use of public 
recreationable facilities to segregated private schools would 
significantly affect desegregation of the public school system 
and in enjoining city officials from permitting such usage. 
With respect to "nonexclusive" use, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that the Distri ct Court's order was "overbroad." The Court ' s 
language follows: 
However, to the extent that the court's 
order may be read to prohibit the use and 
enjoyment of public recreational facilities 
byrindividual children or groups of students 
enrolled at private schools in common with 
other members of I.he public, we find the 
order to be overbLoad . The children enrolled 





as citizens to make use of all munici-
pal recreational facilities. .The Supreme 
Court has pointed out that, while the 
Constitution requires public authorities 
to abstain from assisting certain private 
schools, "it does not require the state 
to be their adversary." Everson v. Bd. 
of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18, 67 S.Ct. 
504, 513, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947). 
Permitting private school groups to 
enjoy such recreational facilities as 
zoos, museums, and parks or to at t end, 
along with other citizens, civic and 
cultural events conducted in city recrea-
tional facilities does not involve the 
same degree of affirmative state action 
as granting exclusive control of public 
facilities for private school functions. 
Nonexclus ive use of governmental facilities 
and services does not provide a means by 
which schools may raise revenue. No schools, 
public or private, were shown to have con-
structed or ma i ntained facilities such as 
zoos, parks and the like. Thus , the op-
portunity to make communal use of this type 
of recreat i onal facility _does not enable 
the private school to duplicate public 
school operations at public expense. The 
nonexclusive enjoymen t of municipal 
recreational facilities by private school 
children was not ·proven to present a suf-
ficient threat to desegregated public educa-
tion to support an injunction restraining 
the clear personal right of the affected 
children to enjoy such usage in common with 
the rest of the public. 
The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that private schools 
should be distinguished on the basis of admissions policies. 
•• • This distinction would be inconsistent 
with the rationale for our limited affirmance 
of the injunction. The basis for the dis trict 
court's action lies in its authority to r r event 
impediments by public authorities which h inder 
the accomp lishment of the constitutional duty, 
specifically recognized in earlier orders of 
that court, to desegregate the Montgomery 
public school system . It was well within the 





find that the right of black children 
to enjoy a des e gregated public education 
could be frustrated as effec t ively when 
whites leave the public system for private 
schools which are segregated adventitiously 
as when their "flight" is to private schools 
which are segrega t ed as a matter of school 
policy. Therefore, we affirm the decision 
of the district court not to distinguish 
among segregated schools on the basis of 
their admissions policies. 
Turning next to the use of recreational facilities by 
non-school organizations, the Court of Appeais reversed the 
District Court's injunction. After discussing Moose Lodge 
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), the Court of Appeals 
concluded: 
Irvis requires revers al of that portion 
of the district court's order which deals 
with non-school affiliated groups. Irvis 
involved the licensing of an otherwise 
private club located in a private building, 
while the present case -involvPs the use of 
publicly owned recreational f ilities. 
Th e use of *tplic pro¥er~y br ugs this case 
closer to_ t e fags o Burton . There are, 
however , two controlling distinctions. 
First, the periodic us e of recreational 
facilities by private clubs does not approach 
the "symbiotic relationship" between the pub-
lic parking authority and the private lessee 
that was present in Burton. Second, Burton 
involved a restaurant holding itself out as 
a place of public accommodation. The injunc-
tion in the present case, like the injunction 
in Irvis, affects bona fide private social 
social and religious organizations •••• 
Where there is no significant effect on the 
countervailing rights of excluded indivi d-
uals, ~ch private groups cannot be denied 
accessApublic recreational facilities solely 









4. CONTENTIONS: Petitioners contend that the Court 
of Appeals erred in relying upon Moose Lodge. They argue that 
this case is much closer to Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). In this case, the subject 
facilities are publicly owned, the cost of maintaining the 
faci l ities comes from public funds, and the facilities are part 
of the City's governmental functions. The two points relied 
upon by the Court of Appeals to distinguish Burton are unpersuasive . 
First, the "periodic use" of public facilities in the instant 
. 
case i s equally objectionable fo~ constitutional purposes as the 
more sustained use in Burton, and the recreational facilities, like 
the restaurant in Burton, are "held out" as public facilities. If 
anything, the present case is more objectionable than Burton, be-
cause the City had foreknowledge 0£ the discriminatory use of the 
puLl ic property . 
With respect to the portion of the Court of Appeals' judg-
ment deal ing with "nonexclusive" use of public f acilities by 
segregated schools, the petitioners argue that the Fifth Circuit ' s 
test is nothing more than a restatement of the Fourth Circuit's 
"substantial effect" test which was rejected in Wright v. Council 
of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). It allows the City to 
provide benefits to segregated schools as long as it does not 
provide them on an exclusive basis. 
Petitioners also add several subsidiary arguments. 





this case. (2) The scheme at issue here would provide an 
opportunity to avoid this Court's school desegregation deci-
sions. (3) The lower courts are finding it hard to draw the 
I 
line between Moose Lodge and Burton. See,~- Falkenstein v. 
Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (1972); Male v. Cross-
roads Associates, 469 F.2d 616 (CA 2 1972); Lucas v. Wisconsin 
Electric Power Coo, 466 F.2d 638 (CA 7 1972). (4) The "non-
exclusive" u s e test is unworkable. (5) Important rights are at 
stake. 
Respondents oppose certiorari but do not cross-petition. - - - -Respondents argue that the Court of Appeals was correct in holding · 
that the individual children who attend private schools may not 
be deprived of the right to use museums or zoos. Petitioners got 
all they were entitled to in the injunction against exclusive use. 
With respect to the non-school organizations, the respondents rely 
upon Moose Lodge. 
5. DISCUSSION: With respect to the non-school organiza-
tions, I find this case much closer to Burton than to Moose Lodge. 
On this issue, the case boils down to a "state action" question. 
Here, the City does more than operate a regulatory scheme that 
grants a liquor license to a discriminatory organization. The 
City is permitting discriminatory organizations to use public 
facilities for their activities, and, it appears, fund-raising 
programs by these organizations are in no way precluded. This is 
much more of a "symbiotic relationship" than was involved in 








distinguish Burto seem unpersuasive, and the fact that the City 
allows all groups' to use the recreational facilities would not 
seem an adequate defense. 
With respect to the Court of Appeals' approach to the 
schools and to the school affiliated groups, its exclusive-non-
exclusive dichotomy is far from clear. Assuming a park with 
numerous baseball diamonds, the City probably could not consti-
tutionally allow a segregated school to reserve one of the diamonds 
for one of its athletic events. Even though this use is nonexclu-
sive, in the sense that other groups will be using the park, albeit 
not the particular diamond, this situation seems to be covered by 
the injunction as approved by the Court of Appeals (See petn. p. 9a) 
On the otheI hand, the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding 
that individual s t udents may not be _prevented from going to a 
p~blic ~o merely because they attend private, segregate d schools. 
When, however, does a group of individual students become a school 
function, and when does a use by such a group become an "exclusive" 
use? 
Norwood v. Harrison is, of course, crucial. Allowing the 
use of municipal recreational facilities, especially when admission 
is charged and retained is, li~e the provision of textbooks, "a 
form of financial assistance inuring to the benefit of the private 
schools." It may be argued that the use of recreationa~. facilities 
is, in a very real sense, "necessary" to the educational proceeds. 
However, municipal facilities are, unlike books, "generalized ser-









and such facilities, unlike books, are not "a fonn of assistance 
readily available from sources entirely independent of the State." 
In short, while Norwood provides adequate support for the injunc-
tion against exclusive use (and no cross-petition is filed), in 
view of the unclear line drawn by the Court of Appeals between 
exclusive and nonexclusive use, it may be desirable to remand the 
case in light of Norwood for further consideration of whether the 
"nonexclusive" use standard, when applied in the context of schools 
satisfies the constitutional requirements. Also, it is unclear 
whether the District Court's reliance upon the composition of the 
student bodies of the private schools, despite the announced open-
enrollment poli cies, is sufficient to satisfy Norwood's requi rement 
of "individualized consideration." 
6/28/73 
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LFP 1 s Supplement to Cert Note  
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l-4. .. d ,e_ I.,,. d ~ - • 
Attached hereto is the pool cert note by Bob Barnett, 
together with Jack Owens' preliminary comment in the margin. 
I dictate this memorandum as a brief summary to record my 
preliminary thinking . 
Petitioners attack Birmingham's policy with respect 
to use of city recreational facilities . According to the CA 5 
opinion, the city makes !!football, basketball and baseball 
facilities owned and operated by it available to private 
groups, including schools, churches, civil clubs and charitable ...._ 
organizations . 11 The petitioners' motion was submitted to the 
DC on an agreed statement of facts which included the following : 
9 
11 Municipal recreational facilities in the 
City of Montgomery are not exclusively leased 
to any particular group and such facilities are 
not made available exclusively to any particular 
group . Football, basketball and baseball 
facilities are made available to groups who 
make application therefor on a non- discriminatory 
basis without regard to race or color, including 
such private groups as churches, athletic leagues, 
civic clubs, charitable organizations, and 
education&l institutions, without regard to 
~~r-o ~~/:o~ 
4- •• , ' J7 ~ ~ k;  ~ ( ~ 







race or color . Athletic participation which 
is sponsored by the (Municipal Parks) and 
Recreation Board, i . e, junior high school 
age football teams, are given preference in 
facility scheduling . All municipal recreational 
facilities throughout the City of Montgomery 
are open to all on an equal basis with people 
2 . 
of the community all having equal access thereto, 
without regard to race or color . 11 Respondent I s 
brief, p . 3- 4 . 
The petitioners sought two types of relief (see questions 
presented in their petition, p . 2) : (i) to enjoin the city 
from allowing segregated schools to make any use of the 
athletic facilities; and (i i ) also to enjoin the city from - ---·-allowing nonschool private organizations which are segregated 
from using recreational facilities . I view these two issues 
as quite different, meriting a different analysis . 
Use by Segregated Private Schools 
The DC found extensive use of the athletic facilities 
by segregated schools, that athletic and recreational facilities 
are normally a sponsored act i vity by all school s, that the 
providing of facilities therefor was significant state aid 
to segregated school which adversely affected the court 
decreed integration of schools in Birmingham, that this city 
action violated the affirmative duty doctrine and is 
unconst i tutional . 
The DC granted full relief on the school issue, both 
with respect to the private schools which publicly acknowledged 





schools which professed a different policy but which in fact 
were wholly segregated . CA 5, in an unclear opinion on this -issue, remanded the case with instructions that the District 
Court clarify paragraphs 1 and 2 of its order ttto make clear 
that the City of Montgomery is not prohibited from permitting 
nonexclusive access to public recreational facilities and 
general government services by private schools or school 
affiliated groups . n Petition 16a. 
3 . 
The Court 1 s opinion (before reaching its final 
paragraph - Petition lOa) said that the DC 1 s order could be 
read nto prohibit the use and enjoyment of public recreational 
facilities by individual children or groups of students 
enrolled at private schools in common with other members of 
the public, 11 and to that extent 11 the order (is) overbroadn . 
I would agree that 11 individual children or groups of students 11 
should not be prohibited from the use in common with all other 
children of public recreational facilities . There is a 
distinction, no doubt difficult to draw at times, between - -
what the individual children or groups within a school may 
do more or less privately, as contrasted with an organized, --- ,., "" 
official or sponsored school program (such as the customary 
athletics programs) . 
But then the opinion of the Court seems to wander 
off into a distinction between ttexclusive controln and 
ttnonexclusive control 11 , which I do not entirely understand . 




all relief requested as to the schools , perhaps a remand by 
this Court is necessary to require a clarification as to 
the scope and purpose of the CA 5 opinion . 
4 . 
Private Nonschool Clubs, Groups, Cha -ritable and other Organizations 
Without having done any individual research, I would 
think that the DC 1 s holdi ng am.order go far beyond any 
previous decision in denying - as a matter of constitutional 
law - the use of 11 city owned or operated recreational 
facilities by any private group, club or organization which 
has a racially discriminatory admissions policy. 11 
As agreed in the stipulated facts, this ban would 




charitable organizations . - - II As 11 recreational facilities 11 are not defined or limited in any way, this would ...... -
RRXXXXNXXNRX certainly include - as CA 5 ' s opinion N± i ndicates -
· all activities at public parks, playgrounds, museums, zoos, ~~ '7E· --e:~ ., E., .. """ 
sta(ia, etc . : 
~ 
The petition appears to lack enthusiasm for this 
issue, as the discussion and analysis (almost none) is 
superficial and fragmentary. Petitioners rely on Burton v . 
W±xk±N Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S . 715, which 
involved a parking building built by a public authority which 
was - according to the opi nion - 11 dedicated to publ i c uses 
in performance of the authority ' s essential governmental 




essential part of the garage complex) discriminated against 
blacks, although he held his restaurant open to serve the 
public. The court held that the discrimination, under the 
facts and circumstances
1
was state action and hence invalid. 
5 . 
I see little precedential relevance of Burton to the 
instant case. Blacks were not excluded from any of the city ' s 
recreational facilities, and this is a critical distinction. 
Nor do I find Moo se Lodge to be particularly relevant, 
as blacks there were discriminated against by the private club 
in question. My tentative view (subject to further considera-
~
tion) is that there is no issue of racial discrimination in 
this case . The only issue is whether the state has the same . .,.. 
sort of affirmative duty with respect to all private organiza-
tions with discriminatory membershippolicies not to aid them 
in any way, that the state concededly has with respect to 
schools which are within the ambit of the affirmative duty 
doctrine . 
If the DC 1 s holding were sustained its logic could 
quite well mean the end of all private discrimination, a 
quite serious infringement of asao,,£,iational rights . How, for 
~ ,.. --
example, could a principled distinction be drawn between 
public recreational facilities made available on a non-
discriminatory basis to all eitizens, and the myriad of 
X@ other city services similarly made available : streets, 






first aid service, welfare and medical service, etc . ? Indeed, 
if there is a constitutional obligation to be discovered here 
for the first time not to "aid" in any way a private organiza-
tion which discriminates against others on account of race, 
creed, religion or sex, no such organization could hold a 
corporate charter, obtain a building permit, operate a vehicle 
with a state license or indeed survive . 
Perhaps I have missed something quite fundamental -
although neither the petition nor Judge Johnson 1 s opinion 
provides any clue as to what it may be . In the absence of 
further light being XRNN shed on the applicable principles, 
I would deny the petition as to the second issue and probably -
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN. JR. V 
January 22, 1974 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 72-1517 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery 
I note on the assignment sheet that the Chief 
Justice plans to circulate a memorandum in the above 
and await responses before assigning the opinion. I 
have already begun work on a similar memorandum and 
have discovered that the record on file here does 
not contain all of the material (depositions, settle-
ment agreement, etc.) relevant to the history of the 
case which apparently begins with a complaint filed 
over fourteen years ago on December 22, 1958. I have, 
therefore, asked the Clerk to ask the parties to 
supplement the record and will complete my memorandum 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
;§~ .· ,,.., . 
j;u.pteutt {!Jonrl llf ffyt 'Jll.ttitth j;faftg 
~rulftingfon. gl. QJ. 2lJffe)L,~ 
January23, 1974 
Re: 72-1517 - Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, Ala. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
With my contemplated absence for nine or ten days, 
I have asked Harry to do a memo on the above case. 
There is no clear-cut consen-sus as yet. The 
responses to that memo will afford a basis for a 
disposition and final assignment. 
Regards, \ 
,-c..J// (/ 
- j;u.prmtt <.qcud cf tlr~ 1Jlnitth" ;§tntts-1.lthtsfyingfon. ~. <.q. 211g;,1,g 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS February 6, 1974 
Dear Bill: 
In 72-1517, Gilmore v. City of 
Montgomery please join me in your memo 
of Feb . 5, 1974. 
tel-{) 
WILLIAi'--1 O. DOUGLAS 
Mr . LTustice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
✓ 
.-
- .:§u:µun~ (qcmt {tf tqt 'J!!ttittb .®taus 'DJasqittgfon. tf). <q. 2l.lbJJ.l..;l "' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
Febru~ry 11, 1974 
\. 
Re: No. 72-1517 - Gilmore v. City of Montg?mery 
Dear Bill: 
It seems to me that as a remedial matter in connection 
with prior school desegregation decrees and wholly aside from 
litigation focusing on parks and recreational facilities, the 
District Court could properly forbid private, all-white 
schools from using public recreational facilities for school-
sponsored activities that are part of the educational program 
of the school, whether or not the use is in common with 
others. To this extent, I see no reason for further proceed-
ings in the District Court except to make sure that the 
District Court's decree reaches this far. At the same time, 
it could be made clear that use of public recreational 
facilities by individual children or groups of children, as 
members of the public but not as part of the educational 
functions of a white school, is not forbidden. Whether a 
majority would support this disposition with respect to the 
private schools, I do not know. 
- -2- "' You also remand the case to the District Court to 
reconsider the use of public recreational facilities by 
I 
private groups with segregated membership policies against 
the background of the District Court's prior and pending ~ 
efforts to complete the task of desegregating the city's 
recreational facilities. This clearly rejects Judge 
Johnson's judgment that the city may not permit the temporary, 
exclusive use of city recreational facilities by p~ivate 
clubs with racial ~embership requirements, without regard 
to whether such prohibition is essential to an effective 
remedy for an official segregation policy. I am frank to say 
that I am not at rest on this issue. I don't think that 
Moose Lodge necessarily controls. The question there con-
cerned the significance of the grant of a license as part of 
a regulatory program. No public subsidy was involved; and 
without the regulatory regime, the club, like others, could 
have sold liquor to its members. In terms of state involve-
ment in segregation, there is something fundamentally 
different where the city furnishes recreational facilities to 
a club that otherwise would not and likely could not have 
their use. At the same time, if the use of "recreational 
facilities" may be forbidden, the same could not be said 
with respect to renting or permitting the use of public 
facilities for communicative, speech-related purposes or 
~ 
- -3- "-wi t h respect to furnishing ordinary municipal services such 
a s police and fire protection. Of course, I would prefer 




Mr . Justice Brennan 
Cop i es to Conference 
-
I 
.ittp-rtmc <qcu:rt cf tfyt ~ttift~ ~htlts 
'Ulaslrittghttt, W, <q. 2llffeJ.~.$ I / 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL February 12, 1974 
Re: No. 72-1517 -- Gilmore v. City of Montgomery 
Dear Bill: .' 
I agree with much of Byron's letter in this case. 




Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
No. 72-1517 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery 
Potter's note to you of this date, reminds me that I too have 
wanted to let you know that I will await Harry Blackmun's circulation. 
As you know from my remarks· at Conference, I cannot go 
along with the portion of Judge Johnson's order which would deny any 
"segregated group" - however small and however unrelated either to 
the past litigation over the parks or the schools - the privilege of 
using public parks and recreational facilities with other taxpayers in 
common. Indeed, I simply cannot recall an order in any case as 
far reaching and as prejudicial to the right; of individuals, as this 
one seems to me to be. 
Perhaps I do not understand it, and so I am awaiting all 
circulations before I come to rest. 
Mr .. ,Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
I 
- .iuµumt QJottd ttf tfyt ~nittb j;tattn ~nnlrittgLm. ~- QJ. 2ll.;iJ~.;t 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
February 19, 1974 
Re: No. 72-1517, Gilmore v. City of Montgomery 
Dear Bill, 
I shall await Harry Blackmun's circulation before 




Mr. Justice Brennan 




~tt}Tr~'-+'t.1' ci;anrt of ±1[.t ~---cit~ ~~kf 
~ct1>1p.n.g±.cn. 'JB. <.q:. 20ffe.l1,;l 
JU STICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
May 20, 1974 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 72-1517 - Gilmore v. City of Montgomery 
I am not entirely sure of my posture with respect 
to an o,Pinion for this case. With his note of January 23 to 
the Conference, the Chief asked me to prepare a memo-
randum. Then, on February 5, Bill Brennan circulated 
his conclusions. I do not wish to 11 steal his thunder. 11 
The enclosed, however, represents my conclu-
sions, and it is submitted to you £or such consideration as 
it may deserve. 
I differ with Bill in some detailso First,, I feel 
that the Court of Appeals' 11 exclusive 11 use approach is 
confusing and needs clarificationo Bill, I believe, would 
hold that 11 exclusive 11 use encompasses any school-spon-
sored or directed utilization of municipal recreation fa-
cilities that 'enable[s] the private school to duplicate 
public school operations at public expense. 1 rr (Draft at 
10, n. 7.) For me, a problem with this is that the def-
inition does not include 11 exclusive 11 use by private groups, 
which, I think, can be most questionable upon an appro-
priate s hawing of state action. 
It would perhaps also define as II exclusive" sit-
uations that, in normal understanding, would be thought 
11nonexclusive 11 or "in common with others." For exam-
ple, Bill's definition might label as 11 exclusive 11 the at-
tendance by a private school science club at a science 
conference in the city museum open to science dubs at 
all area schools. It would be my understanding that th.is 
attendance would be a 11nonexclusive 11 useo This does not 
,. 
r 
mean th.at the attendance would necessarily be constitutionally 
permitted, only that it should not be called ''ex clusive. 11 
Tt1i s na rrower definition, I believe, ·is what the CA really 
intended, since, in the record before it, it was dealing 
with the use of sta dia and playing fields o 
Because of these difficulties, I have include d a 
more extended discussion of the CA' s exclusive use holding 
with respect to schools. Bill would affirm this part of the 
judgme nt (draft at 15-16), but would not develop it in detail 
because respondent s did not cross-petition (draft, footnotes 
6 and 8). I do not think we should accept it as it stands, and 
I therefore believ e it is necessary to clarify it. This can be 
done only by discussing the entire CA judgment. Prudence 
also dictates this treatment, to my mind, because this type 
of case is likely to arise in many other circumstances, and 
it is important to have a clear statement on what is and what 
is not constitutionally acceptable in this area. Moreover, 
the discussion of the "exclusive" aspects of the case should 
provide guidance to district courts in developing further the 
nonexclusive and private clubs parts of this case. 
Second, I have tried to develop in more detail, some-
what along the lines Byron suggested, the areas that the Distri ct 
Court should consider on remand. This will encourage, hope-
fully, a mature consideration int his case and well developed 
sets of findings and conclusions in other cases that we might 
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The present phase of this prolonged litigation concerns 
the propriety of a federal court's enjoining a municipality 
from permitting the use of public park recreational facili-
ties by private segregated school groups and by other non-
school groups that allegedly discriminate in their mem-
bership on the basis of race. We granted certiorari to 
consider this important issue. 414 U. S. 907 (1973). 
~10~ 
I 
Petitioners are Negro citizens of Montgomery, Ala-
bama. In December 1958, now over 15 years a.go, they 
instituted this class action to desegregate Montgomery's 
public parks. The defendants are the city, its Board of 
Commissioners and the members thereof, the Parks and 
Recreation Board and its members, and the Superintend-
ent of the Parks and Recreational Program. 
By their original complaint, the petitioners specifically 
challenged, on Fourteenth Amendment due process and 
equal protection grounds, a Montgomery ordinance (No. 
21-57, adopted June 4, 1957) which made it a misde-
meanor, subject to fine and imprisonment, "for white and 
colored persons to enter upon, visit, use or in any way 






~ ~ ~ ~ 
4,9~4fvaJ 





2 GILMORE v. CITY OF MONTGOMERY 
occupy public parks or other public houses or public 
places, swimming pools, wading pools, beaches, lakes or 
ponds except those assigned to their respective races." 
Both declaratory and injunctive relief were requested.1 
On September 9, 1959, the District Court entered its 
judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutional and 
enjoined the defendants from enforcing the ordinance 
"or any custom, practice, policy or usage which may re-
quire plaintiffs, or any other Negroes similarly situated, 
to submit to enforced segregation solely because of race 
or color in their use of any public parks owned and 
operated by the City of Montgomery, Alabama." The 
judgment was accompanied by a memorandum opinion. 
176 F. Supp. 776 (MD Ala. 1959). On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed but ordered the judgment modified to 
provide that the District Court retain jurisdiction. 277 
F. 2d 364, 368 ( 1960). The trial court, accordingly, ruled 
that it "will and does hereby retain jurisdiction of this 
cause until further order." 2 
In 1970, the petitioners sought to reopen the litigation. 
They filed a motion asking, among other relief, that the 
defendants be cited for contempt "for deliberately avoid-
-i Prior to the institution of the suit, some of the plaintiffs had 
petitioned the City's Parks and Recreation Board, and the plaintiffs 
and others had petitioned the City's Board of Commissioners to pro-
vide access to the city parks for petitioners and all other Negro 
citizens similarly situated. The Chairman of the Parks and Recre-
ation Board replied that the Board "has no authority in this matter." 
The Board of Commissioners responded, "The Commission will not 
operate integrated parks." Exhibits attached to complaint filed 
December 22, 1958, in Civil Action No. 1490-N, United States Dis. 
trict Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Northern Division. 
After petitioners filed their suit , the city closed its parks. It con-
tmued, however, to own and maintain them. 
2 On April 22, 1964, after the case had lain dormant for four years, 
the District Court ordered the file closed "without prejudice to any 
party to this litigation petitiomng this Court for a reinstatement ." 
72-1517-MEMO (A) 
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ing and violating this Court's Judgment and Order in 
this case." 3 The motion contained allegations that some 
of the municipal parks had been reopened "in such a 
manner to avoid the total and full integration of said 
parks"; that the city had conspired with the Montgomery 
YMCA to segregate swimming and other recreational fa. 
cilities and programs; that recrea,tional facilities were un• 
equally allocated as between white and Negro neighbor-
hoods; and that the city discriminated in its employment 
of personnel in recreational programs. The basis for 
these claims arose from other, separate litigation initiated 
in 1969 and resulting in the granting of affirmative relief 
to the plaintiffs in that suit. See Smith v. Young Men's 
Christian Assn., 316 F. Supp. 899 (MD Ala. 1970), aff'd as 
modified, 462 F. 2d 634 (CA5 1972). In that action the 
District Court found that the "coordinated effort" of the 
city and of the YMCA, 316 F. Supp., at 908, and an agree-
ment between them, reached shortly before the closing 
of the city parks and the entry of the court's 1959· decree, 
had effectuated "the perpetuation of segregated recrea-
tional facilities and programs in the City of Mont-
gomery," id., at 909, and that it was "unmistakably clear 
that its purpose was to circumvent the Supreme Court's 
and this Court's desegregation rulings in the area of public 
recreation." Id., at 908.4 The modification by the Court 
3 Petitioners' motion, filed August 7, 1970, was styled as a "Motion 
to Cite Defendants for Contempt and for Relief." On October 2, 
the District Court granted the further motion of the petitioners that 
the August 7 motion be treated as an amendment to the original 
complaint. 
4 The record in that case revealed a deliberate attempt to thwart 
the desegregation order of the District Court. In 1958, the city 
and the YMCA formed a coordination committee. It was agreed that 
the YMCA would not offer any program that would duplicate or 
conflict with one offered by the city's recreation department. The 
YMCA conducteq. football, basketball, and track pro(?;rams for all 
4 
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of Appeals related only to the disapproval of a provision 
in the District Court's order directing a specific Negroc 
White ratio in the YMCA's board and executive com-
mittee. No review was sought here. 
The claims raised by the petitioners in their 1970 
motion were settled by agreement dated January 29, 
1971.5 On July 29, the respondents filed their first 
written progress report. On September 8, the petitioners 
filed a "M~i.9n for SupJ)lemental_!lelief." App. 15. 
This motion forms the basis for the present phase of the 
the elementary school children of the city, but not for the junior 
high students. The responsibility for administering junior high pro-
grams was delegated to the Recreation Department. Each ele-
mentary school supposedly was assigned to the nearest YMCA 
branch. Yet the District Court found that "every predominantly 
white school in the city is assigned to one of the three all-white 
branches even though the school may be closer to the Cleveland 
Avenue [Negro] branch. Every predominantly Negro school is, 
regardless of its location, assigned to the Cleveland Avenue branch." 
316 F. Supp., at 905. The YMCA also was given free use of the 
city's parks, playgrounds, and lighting equipment for its various 
athletic programs, and free water for its swimming pools. The city 
did not reopen its pools after it closed the parks in 1959. "In 1957, 
the YMCA operated one small branch in downtown Montgomery 
which had less than 1,000 members. By 1960, two years after the 
'Co-ordination Committee' had been created, it operated five branches 
with five swimming pools. Today the YMCA operates six branches 
with eight swimming pools and has approximately 18,000 members." 
Id., at 908. 
5 The settlement agreement appears to have been aimed at pro, 
viding equal recreational facilities for the Negro population of Mont-
gomery. It specified the construction of new community centers 
and a new recreation center. Improvements were to be made to 
existing predominantly Negro facilities. The city agreed to main-
tain all community centers "on an equal basis and to the same 
manner and extent." 
The agreement was approved by the District Court on January 
29, 1971. Jurisdiction, however, was "specifically retained," and the 
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litigation. The petitioners complained that the city was 
permitting racially segregated schools and other segre-
g~ private groups and clubs t~ use city parks and 
recreational facilities. They requested injunctive relief 
against "the use of city owned and operated recreational 
facilities by ~ private s~hool group, club, or ~iza-
tion which is racially segregated or which has a racially 
discriminatory admissions policy." 
The District Court granted the petitioners the relief K 
they requestea . 337 F . Supp. 22 (MD Afa. '1972). Tlie lj 
co~ that Montgomery officials were under an 
affirmative duty to bring about and to maintain a derng-
regated public school system. Providing recreational 
facilties to de facto or de jure segregated private schools 
was inconsistent with that duty because such aid en-
hanced the attractiveness of those schools, generated 
capital savings that could be used to improve their pri~ 
vate educational offerings, and provided means to raise 
other revenue to support the institutions, all to the detri• 
ment of establishing the constitutionally mandated 
unitary public school system. The court, consequently, · 
!ilnjoined the city and its officials "from permitting or in 
any: w sanctioning the use of city owned or ope~ 
recreational facilities y any private -school, or private 
s~p, if such school or group is racially 
segregated or if it has a racially discriminatory admissions 
policy." Id ., at 26. The court went on, however, with 
s arse findin s and brief discussion, and similarly en-
joined t e city and its officials from permitting or sanc-
tioning th e use of city recreational facilities "by any 
_rrivate group, club or organization which is not affiliatecl . 
with a private school and which has a racially discrimina-
tory admisions policy.'' Ibid. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed in part and 
remanded the case with directions. 473 F. 2d 832 (CA5 
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restrained the use of city facilities by segregated private 
schools when that use was "exclusive" and not in common 
with other citizens. Id., at 837. The court ruled, how-
ever, that "nonexclusive enjoyment" of those facilities 
by private school children "was not proven to present a 
sufficient threat to desegregated public education to sup~ 
port an injunction restraining the clear personal right of 
the affected children to enjoy such usage in common with 
the rest of the public." Ibid. With respect to that 
portion of the District Court's order concerning other 
private nonschool groups, the Court of Appeals held that 
there was no "symbiotic relationship" of the kind present 
and condemned in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity, 365 U. S. 715 (1961). Consequently, it held that 
under Moose Lodge No . 102 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), 
that portion of the District Court's order d'ealing with 
nonschool groups must be reversed because the injunc-
tion impermissibly intruded upon the freedom of associ-
ation of citizens who were members of private groups. 
The court, accordingly, ordered deletion of certain para-
graphs of the injunctive order and the clarification of 
others. 473 F. 2d, at 839-840. The District Court com-
plied with that mandate and , in particular, added the 
following paragraph to its injunctive order : 
"The injunction issued by this Court does not 
prohibit the City of Montgomery from permitting 
non-exclusive access to public recreational facilities 
and general government services by private schools 
orsch~ 
The plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari; the defendants 
did not cross-petiton. 
II 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not prohibit the "[i] ndividual invasion 
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11 ( 1883). It does proscribe, however, state action "of 
every kind" that operates to deny any citizen the equal 
protection of the laws. Ibid. This proscription on state 
1;1,ction applies de facto as well as de jure because " [ c] on-
duct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined 
with governmental policies or so impregnated with a 
governmental character as to become subject to the con-
stitutional limitations placed upon state action." Evans 
v. Newton, 382 U. S. 296, 299 (1966). In the present 
case we must determine whether the city of Montgomery 
engaged in discriminatory activity violative of the parks 
desegregation order. We must also decide whether the 
city's involvement in the alleged discriminatory activity 
of segregated private schools and other private groups, 
through its providing recreational facilities, constitutes 
"state action" subject to constitutional limitation. 
A 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court inso--
far as the latter enjoined the "exclusive possession of 
public recreational facilities such ;;;:;-rootball stadiums, 
baseball diamonds, basketball courts, and tennis courts 
for official athletic contests and similar functions spon-
sored by racially segregated private schools." 473 F. 2d, 
at 836-837. The boundaries of this "exclusive" use 
approach, however, are not self-evident. We find the 
concept helpful not so much as a controlling legal prin-
ciple but as a description of a type of use and, in the 
context of this case, suggestive of a means of allocating 
public recreational facilities. The term "exclusive use" 
implies that an entire facility is exclusively, and com-
pletely, in the possession, control and use of a private 
group.6 It also implies., without mandating, a decision~ 
u We understand the term "exclusive use" not to include the situ~ 
ation where only part of a facility may be allocated to or used by a 
group, even thou~h that allocation or use results in the pro tantq· 
I l<rh.J ~ ~~
- 1~1~ > 
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making role for the city in allocating such facilities 
among private and, for that matter, public groups. 
Upon this understanding of the term, we agree with 
petitioners that the city's policy of allocating facilities 
to segregated private schools, in the context of the 
1959 parks desegregation order and subsequent history, 
created, in effect, "enclaves of segregation" and deprived 
petitioners of equal access to parks and recreational 
facilities. The city was under an affirmative constitu- 1 
tional duty to eliminate every "custom, practice, policy 
or usage" reflecting an "impermissible obeisance to the 
now thoroughly discredited doctrine of 'separate but 
equal.'" Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526,538 (1963). 
This obviously meant that discriminatory practices in 
Montgomery parks and recreational facilities were to be 
eliminated "root and branch," to use the phrase employed 
in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 
391 u. s. 430, 438 (1968) . 
Instead of prompt and orderly compliance with the 
District Court's mandate, however, the city of Montgom-
ery engaged in an elaborate subterfuge to anticipate and 
circumvent the court's order. Segregated recreational 
programs continued to be presented through the con-
veniently cooperating private agency of the local YMCA. 
All public swimming pools were closed allegedly to pre-
vent the mixing of races. Facilities in negro neighbor-
hoods were not maintained equally with those in white 
neighborhoods. In light of these facts, made part of 
the record in this case,7 it was entirely appropriate for the 
exclusion of others. For example, the use of two of a total of 10 
tennis courts by a private school group would not constitute an ex-
clusive use ; the use of all 10 cour1s would. This is not to say that 
the use of two by a private school group would be constitutionally 
permissible. See discussion, infra. 
7 Petitioners requested that the District Court take notice in this 
case of Smith v. Young Men's Christian Assn., supra, in which the 
72-=15i7-MEMO (A) 
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bistrict Court carefully to scrutinize any practice or 
policy that would tend to abandon to segregated private 
groups facilities normally open to members of all races 
on an equal basis. Here, the exclusive use and control of I 
city recreational facilities, however temporary, by private 
segregated schools was little different from the city's 
agreement with the YMCA to run a "coordinated" but, in 
effect, segregated recreational program. It carried the 
brand of "separate but equal" and, in the circumstances of 
this case, was properly terminated by the District Court. 
Particularly important is the fact that the city's poli-
cies operated directly to contravene an outstanding school 
'desegregation order. See Carr v. M 'Jntgomery County 
Board of Education,' 232 F. Supp. 705 (MD Ala. 1964); 
253 F. Supp. 306 (MD Ala. °1966); 289 F. Supp. 647 (MD 
Ala. 1968) , aff'd as modified, 400 F. 2d 1,402 F. 2d 782, 784, 
787 ( CA5 1968), reversed and remanded sub nom. United 
States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, with 
directions to affirm the judgment of the District Court, 395 
U. S. 225 (1969). 8 Certainly, the city's officials were· 
aware of this order and were responsible for seeing that 
no actions on their part would significantly impede the · 
progress of school desegregation in the city. Cooper v. 
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Green v. County School Board 
of New Kent County, 391 U.S., at 437-438; Alexander v. 
Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U. S. 19, 20 
(1969). Any arrangement, implemented by state officials 
at any level, which significantly tends to perpetuate a 
same district judge had presided. The trial court ruled from the 
bench that it would take judicial notice "of the evidence that was 
presented in the Y. M. C. A. case ." Excerpted transcript, testimony 
of William Chandler, November 20, 1970, p. 7. 
8 Petitioners also requested that the District Court in this case 
take notice of Carr v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 
supra. _The trial_ court in its reported opinion, 337 F . Supp., at 24, 
referred to the duty of the State's school boards to desegregate, 
h--1s11_:1,rnMo (A) 
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dual school system, in whatever manner, is constitution-
ally impermissible. "[T]he constitutional rights of chil-
dren not to be discriminated against ... can neither be 
nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state 
executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by 
them through evasive schemes for segregation whether 
attempted 'ingeniously or ingenuously.' " Cooper v. 
Aaron, 358 U. S., at 17. This means that any tangible 
state assistance, outside the generalized services govern-
ment might provide to private segregated schools in com-
mon with other schools, and with all citizens, is consti-
tutionally prohibited if it has "a significant tendency to 
facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination." 
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 466 (1973). The 
constitutional obligation of the State "requires it to steer 
clear, not only of operating the old dual system of racially 
segregated schools, but also of giving significant aid to 
institutions that practice racial or other invidious discrim-
ination." Id., at 467. 
Here, the city's actions enhanced the attractiveness of 
segregated private schools, formed in reaction against the 
federal court school order, by enabling them to offer 
complete athletic programs. The city's provision of sta-
diums and recreational fields resulted in capital savings 
for those schools and enabled them to divert their own 
funds to other educational programs. It also provided 
the opportunity for the schools to operate concessions 
that generated revenue. We are persuaded, as were both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals, that this 
assistance significantly tended to undermine the federal 
court order mandating the establishment and maintenance 
of a unitary school system in Montgomery. It therefore 
was wholly proper for the city to be enjoined from per-
mitting exclusive access to public recreational facilities 
by segregated private schools and by groups affiliated with 
such schools. 
n~1si7-MEMo (A1 
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Although the Court of Appeals ruled out the exclusive 
use of city facilities by private schools, it went on to mod~ 
ify the District Court order "to make clear that the City 
of Montgomery is not prohibited from permitting nonex~ 
elusive access to public recreational facilities and general 
governmental services by private schools or school affili-
ated groups," 473 F. 2d, at 840, or from permitting access 
to these facilities by private organizations that have a 
racially discriminatory admissions policy. Id., at 839. 
Upon this record , we are unable to draw a conclusion as 
to whether the use of zoos, museums, parks, and other 
recreational facilities by private school roups in com-: 
mon with others, nd by private nonsc ool organizations, 
in~ rnment so ir y m e 
users as to warrant court intervention on constitutional 
grounds. 
It would be improper to determine at this stage the ap-
propriateness of further relief in all the many and varied 
situations where facilities are used in common by school 
groups or used exclusively or in common by private 
~ It is possible that certam uses o city facilities 
will be judged to be in contravention of the parks desegre-
gation order, or the school desegregation order, or in some 
way to constitute impermissible "state action" ascribing 
to the city the discriminatory actions of the groups. The 
record before us does not contain sufficient facts upon 
which to predicate legal judgments of this kind. The 
questions to be resolved and the decisions to be made rest 
upon careful identification of the different types of city 
facilities that are available and the various uses to which 
they might be put by private groups. 
The difficulties that confront us on this record are 
readily apparent. Under appropriate circumstances, the 




12 GILMORE v. CITY OF MONTGOMERY 
exclusive use by private schools, that access in common 
to city facilities by private school groups would indeed 
contravene the school desegregation order. For example, 
all-white private school basketball teams might be in-
vited to participate in a tournament with desegregated 
private and public school teams. Such assistance, al-
though proffered in common with fully desegregated 
groups, might so directly impede the progress of court-
ordered school desegregation within the city that it would 
be appropriate to fashion equitable relief "adjusting and 
reconciling public and private needs." Brown v. Board of 
Education, 349 U.S. 294,300 (1955). The essential find-
ing justifying further relief would be a showing of direct 
impairment of an outstanding school desegregation order. 
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S., at 17; Bush v. Orleans Parish 
School Board, 364 U.S. 500 (1960); Brown v. South Caro-
lina State Board of Education, 296 F. Supp. 199 (S. C. 
1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 222 ( 1968); Poindexter v. Louisiana 
Financ-ial Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (ED La. 
1967), aff'd, 389 U. S. 571 (1968); Lee v. Macon County 
Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458 (MD Ala. 1967), 
aff'd, sub nom. 389 U.S. 215 (1967); Norwood v. Harri-
son, supra. 
Relief would also be appropriate if a particular use 
constitutes a vestige of the type of state-sponsored 
racial segregation in public recreational facilities that 
was prohibited in the parks decree and likewise 
condemned in Watson v. Memphis, 373 U. S. 526 
(1963). See also Dawson v. Mayor and City Council 
of Baltim::>re City, 220 F. 2d 386 (CA4), aff'd, 
350 U. S. 877 (1955); Muir v. Louisville Park The-
atrical Assn., 347 U. S. 971 ( 1954); Holmes v. City of 
Atlanta, 350 U. S. 879 (1955); New Orleans City Park 
Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958). For 
example, the record contains indications that there are 
72-i5i7-MEMO (A) 
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l:L11-white private and all-Negro public Dixie Youth and 
Babe Ruth baseball leagues for children, all of which use 
city-provided ballfields and lighting, balls, bats, mitts, and 
other aid. Were the District Court to determine that 
this dual system came about as a means of evading the 
parks decree, or of serving to perpetuate the separate but 
equal use of city facilities on the basis of race, through 
the aid and assistance of the city, further relief would b~ 
appropriate. 
The problem of private group use is much more com-
~x. The C?urt o ppea s re 1e on oose odge No: 
107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), in concluding that th~ 
use of city facilities by private clubs did not reflect a 
"symbiotic" relationship between government and those· 
groups as to constitute state action. 473 F. 2d, at 
838-839. 
We feel that Moose Lodge is not fully applicableliere: 
Jn that case, we generally followed the approach taken 
in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra, 
where it was stated : 
"Owing to the very 'largeness' of government, a 
multitude of relationships might appear to some to 
fall within the Amendment's embrace, but that, it 
must be remembered, can be determined only in the 
framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances 
present." 365 U. S., at 725-726. 
In Moose Lodqe the litigation was directly against a pri .. 
vate organization, and it was alleged that the organiza-
tion's racially discriminatory policies constituted state 
action. We held that there was no state action in the 
mere fact that the fraternal organization 's beverage bar 
was licensed ahd regulated by the State. In contrast, 
here, as in Burton, the- question of the existence of state 
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discriminatory actions by private agencies and in whether 
that involvement makes the city "a joint participant in 
the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot 
be considered to have been so 'purely private' as to fall 
without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment." 365 
U. S., at 725. Because the city makes city property l 
available for use by private entities, this case is more like 
Burton than Moose Lodge. The question then is 
whether there is s nificant state involvement in the 
private 1scnmination alleged. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 
U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity, supra; Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S. 296 (1966); 
lYloose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, supra. "The Court 
has never held, of course, that discrimination by 
an otherwise private entity would be violative of the 
Equal Protection Clause if the private entity receives 
any sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or if 
it is subject to state regulation in any degree whatever." 
407 U. S., at 173. Traditional state monopolies, such as 
electricity, water, and police and fire protection-all 
generalized governmental services-do not by their mere 
provision constitute a showing of state involvement in 
invidious discrimination. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 
U.S. , at 465; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S., 
at 173. The same is true of parks, for a park "is more 
like a fire department or police department that tradi-
tionally serves the community." Evans v. Newton, 382 
U. S., at 302. If, however, the city or other governmental 
entity rations otherwise freely accessible recreational 
facilities, the case for state act10n w1 naturally be 
stronger than if the facilities are simply available to all 
comers without condition or reservation. Here, for 
example, petitioners allege that the city engages in 
scheduling softball games for an all-white church league 
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city's role in that situation would be dangerously close 
to what was found to exist in Burton, where the city had 
"elected to place its power, property and prestige behind 
the admitted discrimination." 365 U. S., at 725. We 
are reminded, however, that the Court has never 
attempted to formulate "an infallible test for determin-
ing whether the State ... has become significantly 
involved in private discriminations" so as to constitute 
state action. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S., at 378. 
"'Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances' on 
a case-by-case basis can a 'nonobvious involvement of the 
State in private conduct be attributed its true signifi-
cance.'" Id., quoting Burton, 365 U. S., at 722. This 
is the task for the District Court on remand. 
We close with this word of caution. It should be I 
obvious that the exclusion of any person or group-all-
N egro, all-oriental, or all-white-from public facilities 
infringes upon the freedom of the individual to associate 
as he chooses. MR. JUSTICE DouGLAS emphasized this 
in his dissent, joined by MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, in 
Moose Lodge. He observed, "The associational rights 
which our system honors permit all white, all black, all 
brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed. They also 
permit all Catholic, all Jewish , or all agnostic clubs to 
be established. Government may not tell a man or 
woman who his or her associates must be. The indi-
vidual can be as selective as he desires." 407 U. S., at 
179-180. The freedom to associate appliBs to the beliefs 
we share, and to those we consider reprehensible. It 
tends to produce the diversity of opinion that oils the 
machine of democratic government and insures peaceful, 
orderly change. Because its exercise is largely depend-
ent on the right to own or use property, Healy v. James, 
408 U. S. 169, 181-183 (1972) , any denial of access to 
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carefully circumscribed. Certainly, a person's mere 
membership in an organization which possesses a dis-
criminatory admissions policy would not alone be ground 
for his exclusion from public facilities. Having said this, 
however, we must also be aware that the very exercise 
of the freedom to associate by some may serve to infringe 
that freedom for others. Invidious discrimination takes 
its own toll on the freedom to associate, and it is not sub-
ject to affirmative constitutional protection when it 
involves state action. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S., 
at 470. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore 
reversed in part. The case is remanded to that court 
with directions to remand it in turn to the District Court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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~ as~n. 11}. QJ. 2llffe)l..;l 
May 22, 1974 
Re: 72-1517 - Gilmore v. City of Montgomery 
Dear Harry: 
✓ 
I am in general agreement with your memorandum 
of May 20 and will join an opinion along those lines. 
Regards, 
1&1103 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
jiu:vumt ~ou:rt of tfyt 1!lttittlt j;tatts 
'JTaa-Irmgton, IJJ. ~. 20-ffeJ.~~ 
CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTI C E B Y R O N R . WHITE 
May 23, 1974 
Re: No. 72-1517 - Gilmore v. City of Montgomery 
Dear Harry: 
I would prefer to affirm the District 
Court now insofar as its decree bars private 
schools not only from the exclusive use of 
city recreational facilities but also from 
using them for organized school purposes in 
common with others. Otherwise I am agreeable 
to the remand. My preference, however, would 
also be to omit the addendum to the memorandum 
beginning on page fifteen thereof. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
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~ 
No. 72-1517 Gilmore v. Montgomery 
Dear Harry: 
I am in accord with the portion of your memorandum relating 
to the city's assistance to private schools, whether such 
assistance be direct or indirect. This means, I suppose, that 
I could join the first ten pages of your memorandum. 
The remainder of the memorandum deals primarily (although 
not exclusively) with the part of the District Court's order 
which seems to me on its face to constitute a serious infringe-
ment of individual rights. With no findings to support it 
(as you suggest on page 5), the District Court flatly enjoined 
the use of city recreational facilities: 
" ... by any private group, club or organization 
which is not affiliated with a private school and 
which has a racially discriminatory admissions 
policy." 
It is evident from this order, as indicated in the opinions 
below, that city recreational facilities include all parks, 
playgrounds, athletic grounds and facilities, museums, zoos, 
amphitheaters and the like. The injunction applies to -"'any 
// 
segregated private ·group, club or organization" without regard 
to its size or nature from the Thursday bridge club and 
Saturday night poker club to the larger organizations of all 
races and ethnic origin. The order would even deny to all 
.. -· ~ ,. 
2. 
such groups the right to enjoy, in common with other citizens 
and taxpayers, a small picnic or barbeque in a public park. 
It would also exclude such groups from the city zoo, theatres, 
museum, and historic monuments. 
Your opinion recognizes, as I read it, that on remand 
the District Court may on a proper record modify the full sweep 
of its order to exclude certain clubs and groups. But I see 
no r e ason for this Court not to confront the issue presented 
by this extraordinary order and hold it unconstitutional on 
its face as a self-evident infringement of Fi rst Amendment 
rights. By returning this threshold question to the courts 
below without expressing an opinion on it, we leave them 
with relatively little guidance. 
We should also make clear that if, in fact, there are 
private organizations (such as the YMCA, referred to in this 
case) collaboratin& with the city - overtly or covertly - to 
frustrate full desegregation of all public recreational 
facilities, this should not be tolerated. 
In sum, while recognizing the difficulty of your task, 
I wonder whether we will have served a purpose in taking this 
case if we fail to address what for me is plainly the central 
issue. 
Sincerely, 
The same is true of a broad spectrum of municiP,al recreational 
facilities: parks, playgrcnm~ , athletic facilities, 
amplU:theaters, museums, zoos, and the like. Cf. Evans v. -
Newton, 382 U.S. at 302. It follows, therefore, that the 
portion of the District Court's o~der prohibiting the mere 
use of such facilities by any segregated "private group, 
club or organization" is invalid because it was not 
predicated on a finding of a collaborative effort with 
the city to impede or circumvent desegregation of the public 
facility in question. 
-
CHAMBE R S OF 
J USTICE POTTER STEWART 
.®1tpt·ttnt <!Jourt of tlrt ~nitt~ ,§Hates 
~aslri:ttgtott. ;p. <!J. zrrg,>~J 
May 27, 1974 
72-1517, Gilmore v. Montgomery 
Dear Harry, 
I agree with your memorandum in this 
case, as recirculated today. 
Sincerely yours, 
~ . • I.:' 
f/ 
, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
n . . 
er w;c.eJc:rcc (,. 
~~ ~ J ~ ~~-~ 
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jiru1lrhtgfon, ~ - QJ. 2.0ffe'1$ 
JU S TICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
May 28, 1974 
Re: No. 72-1517 - Gilmore v. Montgomery 
Dear Harry: 
Please add my name to those who have indicated they 
agree with the memorandum you have prepared in this case. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
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JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
May 28, l 974 
Dear Lewis: 
Re: No. 72-1517 - Gilmore v. City 
of Montgomery 
I am glad to accommodate you and Potter with 
respect to the rider you propose to replace the third from 
the last full sentence and accompanying citation on page 14. 
I would like, however, to change the final phraseology, 
after the word "predicated," to read "upon a proper finding 
of state action." This, I believe, is consistent with the 
context and, perhaps, is a stronger standard. A copy of 
the rider as so changed is enclosed. 
I shall have this rerun by the printer. 
Mr. Justice Powell 




- No. 72-1517 - Gilmore v. City of Montgomery Rider A, page 14 
The same is true of a broad spectrum of municipal recreational 
facilities: parks, playgrounds, athletic facilities, amphitheaters, 
museums, zoos, and the like. Cf. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S., at 
302. It follows, therefore, that the portion of the District Court's 
order prohibiting the mere use of such facilities by any segregated 
"private group, club or organization" is invalid because it was 
not predicated upon a proper finding of state action. 
-
May 28, 1974 
No. 72-1517 Gilmore v. Montgomery 
Dear Harry: 
I am now with you on your memorandum as 
recirculated today. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
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May 29, 1974 
Re: 72-1517 - Gilmore v. Montgomery 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Regards, 
B 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
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The Brethern in concurrence state that they would 
sustain the District Court insofar as any school-sponsored or 
directed uses of the city recreational facilities that enable private 
segregated schools to duplicate public school operations at public 
expense. It hardly bears repetition that the District Court's original 
injunction swept ;f/ beyond these limits without the fact finding required 
for the prudent use of what would otherwise be the raw exercise 
of a court's equitable powero 
It is by no means apparent, as our Brother Brennan 
correctly notes, which uses of city facilities in common with others 
would have "a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support 
private discriminationo II Norwood Vo Harrison, 413 U. So 455, 466 
(1973). Moreover, we are not prepared, at this juncture and on this 
record, to overlook the standing of these plaintiffs to claim relief 
against certain nonexclusive uses by private school groupso The 
plaintiffs in Norwood were parties to a school desegregation order 
and the relief they sought was directly related to the concrete injury 
they suffered. Here, the plaintiffs were parties to an action de-
segregating the city parks and recreational facilities. Without a 
- properly develop ed record, it is not clear that every nonexclusive 
use of city facilities by school groups,unlike their exclusive use,would 
result in cognizable injury to these plaintiffs. The District Court 
does not have carte blanche authority to administer city facilities 
simply bee ause there is past or present discrimination. The usual 
prudential tenets limiting the exercise of judicial power must be 
observed in this case as in any other. 
- CHAMBERS OF 
~nprtnu <!fa-url cf t~t ~niuh j;mftg 
~~gJrittg-tcn. ~. <!f. 2.0,?'.)t.~ 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
June 4, 1974 
Re: No. 72-1517 - Gilmore v. City of Montgomery 
Dear Chief, Potter, Lewis and Bill: 
Bill Brennan has expressed a desire to join, but has 
suggested a number of changes. Some of these are readily 
acceptable. I am hesitant about others. In an attempt to 
accommodate Bill, I have incorporated a number of his sug-
gestions in the current draft. I believe these will be accept-
able to you, but if they are not, please let me know. 
The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Stewart / 
Mr. Justice Powell I/ 
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JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN . JR. 
June 5, 1974 
No. 72-1517--Gilmore v. City of Montgomery 
Memorandum to the Conference: 
Harry tells me that the changes made at my 
suggestion have not been acceptable to some who 
joined his original circulation. He is therefore 
revising his present draft to delete some matters 
added to meet my suggestions. Accordingly, I shall 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J. BRENNAN, JR. 
June 5, 1974 
RE: No. 72-1517 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery 
Dear Harry: 
You were very generous to adapt my suggestions 
in your revision. I therefore see no reason to 
write and am happy to join your revised opinion. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 






- June 6, 1974 
No. 72-1517 Gilmore v. ~tgomery 
Dear Harry: 
I am still with you. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
-
,§u.prnn c <.Ct11trt of tip• '.l1nitr1' ,§,tafra 
'J.lln,lringhllt. J). ~- :3Ci~>~;, 
CH ~. :vtBCRS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAlvl 0. DOUGLAS June 6, 1974 
Dear Byron: 
Please join re in you:r concurring 
opinion in 72-1517, GILMORE v. CTIY OF 
MONTGOMERY. 
Mr . Justj_ce Hhite 
cc: The Conference 
v, W 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 
June 12, 1974 
No. 72-1517 Gilmore v. Montgomery 
Dear Harry: 
Your proposed footnote looks fine to me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice Relmquist 
- CHAMBERS OF 
.§np-unu <qom-t llf t4~ ~h ~mug 
1ihttllp:ngtatt. ~. <!f. 2.llffeJI.~ // 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN v 
June 12, 1974 
Re: No. 72-1517 - Gilmore v. City of Montgomery 
Dear Chief, Potter, Lewis and Bill: 
I enclose for your 11 pre-print 11 consideration a foot-
note which might be added at the end of the paragraph on 
page 13 of the opinion. I was inclined to feel that something 
like this was indicated in mild response to the two concurring 
opinions. Please let me know if you feel it should be used. 
The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Stewart / 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
r 
~t.tp-rtmt <!Jou.rt cf t4t ')!!tti.frb ~ tates 
~asI7i:n9hm. 10. <!J. 20,?)l,.;:t 
June 12, 1974 
72-1517 - Gilmore v. Montgomery 
Dear Harry, 
Your proposed new footnote is 
acceptable to me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
~s. 
\' / 
Copies to The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
/ 
- CHAMBERS OF 
.§u:.prtuu QJaurt trf tlrt ~m±th ~ talt.G 
~aslrhtgLnr, It}. QJ. 2.0ffeJL~ 
JU S TI C E W ILLI AM H . RE H NQU IS T ✓ 
June 12, 1974 
Re: No. 72-1517 - Gilmore v. City of Montg omery 
Dear Harry : 
I not only feel that the propos ed footno t ~ circulated 
in your memora ndum of June 12th should be used, but I most 
heartily endor se both its felicitous phr asing and its sound 
substance. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copy to: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Stewar t 
Sincere ly, 
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